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FEATURED DEBATE
A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate
by David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey & Jack Balkin

Health care reform has been and continues to be one of the highest priorities in the Obama Administration’s domestic agenda. The proposals for reform played a major role in the debates leading up to President Obama’s election and dominate the Administration’s, and Congress’s, current domestic activities. While most policymakers seemingly agree that reform is necessary, there is much disagreement about the particulars of the appropriate reform. One of the more contested features is the so-called individual mandate—a federal requirement that every American possess a certain level of health insurance.

In A Healthy Debate, David Rivkin and Lee Casey debate Professor Jack Balkin over the constitutionality of such a mandate. In their Opening Statement, Rivkin and Casey argue that if Congress has the power to reform the health care system, it must be found in the Commerce Clause. After examining the Supreme Court's modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Rivkin and Casey conclude that the mandate is even less defensible than the laws struck down in United States v. Morrison or United States v. Lopez. Nor can the mandate be based on the Taxing and Spending Clause because Congress cannot use a tax to regulate conduct that is otherwise indisputably beyond its regulatory power.

In his Rebuttal, Balkin disagrees on both points. Examining the bill passed by the House on November 7, 2009, Balkin argues that, irrespective of the Commerce Clause, the mandate is a bona fide tax that is within Congress's powers to tax and spend for the general welfare. Moreover, Congress could also to pass a mandate under the Commerce Clause because the practices of individuals without health insurance—such as substitution of emergency room services and over-the-counter health remedies—cumulatively and substantially affect interstate commerce.

FEATURED ARTICLE
Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects
by Pauline T. Kim
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Recent studies have established that the decisions of a federal court of appeals judge are influenced not only by the preferences of the judge, but also by the preferences of her panel colleagues. Although the existence of these “panel effects” is well documented, the reasons that they occur are less well understood. Scholars have proposed a number of competing theories to explain panel effects, but none has been established empirically. In Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, Professor Pauline Kim reports an empirical test of two competing explanations of panel effects—one emphasizing deliberation internal to a circuit panel, the other hypothesizing strategic behavior on the part of circuit judges. The latter explanation posits that court of appeals judges act strategically in light of the expected actions of others and that, therefore, panel effects should depend upon how the preferences of the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc are aligned relative to those of the panel members. Analyzing votes in Title VII sex discrimination cases, she finds no support for the theory that panel effects are caused by strategic behavior aimed at inducing or avoiding Supreme Court review. On the other hand, the findings strongly suggest that panel effects are influenced by circuit preferences. Both minority and majority judges on ideologically mixed panels differ in their voting behavior depending upon how the preferences of the circuit as a whole are aligned relative to the panel members. This study provides evidence that panel effects do not result from a dynamic wholly internal to the three judges hearing a case, but are influenced by the environment in the circuit as a whole as well.

FEATURED RESPONSES
Panel Effects, Whistleblowing Theory, and the Role of Legal Doctrine
by Derek J. Linkous & Emerson H. Tiller

In Panel Effects, Whistleblowing Theory, and the Role of Legal Doctrine, Derek Linkous and Professor Emerson Tiller argue that Kim erroneously rejects the Whistleblowing Theory (WT) of circuit panel decisionmaking—a theory emphasizing the role of legal doctrine in constraining ideological decisionmaking by a panel majority. In their response, Linkous and Tiller show how ignoring the strategic and deliberative roles of legal doctrine call into question the explanatory power of Kim’s strategic alignment hypothesis. After laying out the basic premises of WT and explaining WT’s application to both strategic and deliberative models of panel effects, Linkous and Tiller correct two assumptions that lead Kim to reject WT. From there, they address how doctrinal disobedience can be measured empirically by scholars when a legal doctrine (such as a standard) does not command particular outcomes in every case—a concern that led Kim to reject empirical work on WT. While Linkous and Tiller recognize that developing a coding scheme for doctrine is hard work, they argue that failing to even try prevents Kim from addressing a key piece of the panel effects puzzle—the role of legal doctrine.

Psychology, Strategy, and Behavioral Equivalence
by Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek

In Psychology, Strategy, and Behavioral Equivalence, Professor Stefanie Lindquist and Dr. Wendy Martinek recognize that Kim has created an innovative empirical model to test for circuit and Supreme Court effects on panel decisionmaking at the United States Courts of Appeals. They recommend caution, however, in interpreting these results as evidence of strategic behavior since alternative explanations—including the effects of deliberation and circuit court precedent—could also account for the findings presented. Indeed, there is no basis for favoring a strategic theory over a deliberative one. Behavioral equivalence is, unfortunately, often a confounding problem in studies of strategic decision making on appellate courts. Lindquist and Martinek maintain their belief from earlier studies that while strategic behavior may take place on some courts, under some conditions, the strongest influence on federal appellate courts are from judges seeking consensus to promote the efficient administration of justice and to minimize error.





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