What are punitive damages for? In a recent article, I argued that states should understand and restructure punitive damages, in part, to advance the public's interest in retributive justice. For clarity's sake, I called such damages "retributive damages" to distinguish them from extracompensatory damages designed to pursue other goals, such as cost internalization or victim vindication. Although that article explained the normative rationale and basic structure for retributive damages as an intermediate sanction and why society should want that sanction independent of other remedial or penal options, the theoretical nature of the proposal merely scratched the surface of how such damages should operate in practice.

This Article, the second in a series, addresses the next logical question: how should punitive damages work? Both questions are especially timely in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams. This Article focuses on a range of important implementation issues left previously unaddressedóe.g., are any procedural safeguards for defendants facing punitive damages necessary and, if so, which ones and why? How should such damages interact with criminal prosecutions? Should an insurance market be permitted? How should settlement be regulated?