James F. Blumstein examines Professor Richman’s account under the two different “ways of thinking about the product and the industry—the traditional professional/scientific and the market-oriented model.” Explaining that the latter model can play a “constructive role” in the context of hospital mergers, Blumstein concludes that “[a]ntitrust doctrine does not necessarily stand in the way of nonprofit hospitals that seek to merge, but it imposes an analytical metric that focuses on competition and efficiency.”

Professor Duff explores the “third and fourth desert bases Moore identifies” and argues “that there is still some room for a distinctive doctrine of complicity and thus for accomplice liability as a distinctive type of liability.” Duff focuses on the mens rea of accomplice liability, specifically that of intentionality and foresight, and ultimately claims “that, even if all that Moore says about the actus reus is right, it does not warrant his conclusion” that there is no unique desert basis for accomplice liability.

Professor Gardner notes that, though he and Professor Moore agree “that causal wrongs exist,” they “part company [when they] turn to the question of which moral and legal wrongs are causal wrongs.” Gardner argues for a view of accomplice liability that incorporates “causal pluralism,” concluding that “the types of causal contributions made by accomplices to and through the acts of their principals vary” in ways that Moore’s account fails to provide for.